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E-WASTE & THE REGULATORY 
COMMONS: A PROPOSAL FOR THE 
DECENTRALIZATION OF 
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL 
REGULATION 
INTRODUCTION 
n an isolated junkyard at the edges of Lagos, Nigeria, hun-
dreds of laborers, including young children, pick apart 
remnants of discarded electronics to recover valuable minerals 
such as gold and copper. Unaware of the dangerous carcinogens 
and harmful chemicals that abound in the electronic waste (“e-
waste”),1 these workers often burn the e-waste in open air and 
further expose themselves to extremely toxic materials.2 Today, 
increasing demand for the latest technologies drives the fastest 
growing, and potentially most dangerous, waste stream world-
wide.3 Developing countries are the most common destinations 
																																																																																																																												
 1. Electronic components contain small quantities of precious metals such 
as gold and copper. JIM PUCKETT ET AL., EXPORTING HARM: THE HIGH-TECH 
TRASHING OF ASIA 8 (Jim Puckett & Ted Smith eds., 2002), available at 
http://www.ban.org/E-waste/technotrashfinalcomp.pdf. 
 2. Studies indicate that the bodies of those who live near these e-waste 
dumps have the highest amount of cancer-causing dioxins in the world. See 
Janet K.Y. Chan et al., Body Loadings and Health Risk Assessment of Poly-
chlorinated Dibenzo-p-dioxins and Dibenzofurans at an Intensive Electronic 
Waste Recycling Site in China, 41 ENVTL. SCI. & TECH. 7668, 7672 (2007) (not-
ing that breast milk of women who worked in electronic waste recycling cen-
ters had more than two times the concentration of dioxins than do women 
working in a control site and that their placentas had nearly three times the 
concentration of dioxin than do women at the control site). 
 3. Christian Purefoy, Serious Contamination Threat from Africa’s Mount-
ing E-Waste, CNN NEWS (Apr. 9, 2009), 
http://www.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/africa/04/08/africa.recycling.computers.ew
aste/index.html. More recent projections by the United Nations’ Solving the 
E-Waste Problem Initiative (“StEP”) estimate global e-waste volumes to grow 
by 33% in the next four years, making e-waste the world’s fastest growing 
waste stream. John Vidal, Toxic “E-Waste” Dumped in Poor Nations, says 
United Nations, THE GUARDIAN (Dec. 14, 2013), 
http://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2013/dec/14/toxic-ewaste-
illegal-dumping-developing-countries. 
I
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for these wastes.4 For instance, the United Nations Environ-
ment Programme (“UNEP”)5 reports that African countries are 
quickly becoming the final destination for the world’s e-waste.6 
Usually this waste is broken apart and burned by young boys 
in countries like China.7 A 2007 study found that blood lead 
levels of children in Guiyu, China were 50% higher than the 
maximum safe exposure set by the Centers for Disease Control 
and Prevention in the United States.8 
Electronics represent the world’s largest and fastest growing 
manufacturing industry,9 and the exponentially growing pace 
of consumer demand for new gadgets fuels the growth in e-
waste. This waste includes electronic devices such as comput-
ers, mobile phones, television sets, entertainment devices, and 
refrigerators.10 Additionally, any components of these products, 
																																																																																																																												
 4. Vidal, supra note 3. 
 5. The UNEP was created in 1972 at the United Nations Stockholm Con-
ference on the Human Environment to serve as the “focal point for environ-
mental action and coordination” among United Nations members. Institu-
tional and Financial Arrangements for International Environmental Co-
operation, G.A. Res. 2997, pt. II, para. 1, U.N. GAOR, 27th Sess., Supp. No. 
30, U.N. Doc. A/8730, at 43 (Dec. 15, 1972). “The UNEP promote[s] interna-
tional cooperation in the field of the environment.” United Nations Confer-
ence on Environment and Development: Framework Convention on Climate 
Change, May 9, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 849, Agenda 21 – Chapter 38, part 22, 388. 
 6. James Simpson, Toxics Alert: Africa Emerging as E-Waste Dumping 
Ground, TOXICS ALERT (Dec. 2006), http://enews.toxicslink.org/news-
view.php?id=3 (“According to a study by the Basel Action Network (“BAN”), a 
minimum of 100,000 used and obsolete computers a month are entering the 
Nigerian port of Lagos alone.”). 
 7. Bryan Walsh, E-Waste Not, TIME (Jan. 08, 2009), 
http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1870485,00.html. 
 8. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-08-1044, ELECTRONIC WASTE: 
EPA NEEDS TO BETTER CONTROL HARMFUL U.S. EXPORTS THROUGH STRONGER 
ENFORCEMENT AND MORE COMPREHENSIVE REGULATION (Aug. 2008), available 
at http://www.gao.gov/assets/280/279792.pdf. 
 9. See JIM PUCKETT ET AL., THE DIGITAL DUMP: EXPORTING RE-USE AND 
ABUSE TO AFRICA 7 (Jim Puckett ed., 2005), available at 
http://www.ban.org/library/TheDigitalDump.pdf [hereinafter THE DIGITAL 
DUMP]. BAN produced this film and report to document, and increase aware-
ness of, the harmful effects of e-waste dumping in Africa. 
 10. Pakistan: Environment: The Dark Side of Digital Waste, THE FRIDAY 
TIMES (Pak.), May 16, 2010, [hereinafter THE FRIDAY TIMES]; See also What is 
E-Waste?, CAL. DEP’T OF RESOURCES RECYCLING AND RECOVERY, 
http://www.calrecycle.ca.gov/Electronics/WhatisEwaste/ (last updated Oct. 26, 
2012) (stating that the definition of e-waste comprises mobile phones, com-
puters, televisions, batteries, light bulbs, printers, and consumer electronics. 
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including cathode ray tubes (“CRTs”),11 circuit boards, and ink 
cartridges, which are “sold, obsolete, broken or discarded by 
their original owners,” are also considered e-waste.12 As a re-
sult of the rapid pace of innovation and the related issue of 
product obsolescence, e-waste is one of the fastest growing 
types of waste in the industrialized world.13 In fact, the United 
Nations projects global e-waste volumes will grow from 48.9 
million metric tons in 2012 to 65.4 million metric tons in 2017, 
or “the weight equivalent of 200 Empire State Buildings or 11 
Great Pyramids of Giza.”14 Yet consumers who choose to refur-
bish or recycle their unwanted electronics often must spend 
large sums of money or make long trips to designated recycling 
centers,15 and often have few affordable and accessible disposal 
options for electronic waste.16 
As this Note will discuss, in addition to the Basel Convention 
on the Transboundary Movement of Hazardous Wastes and 
																																																																																																																												
There is, however, no legal definition for e-waste. For example, California has 
not been able to determine if certain items, like microwave ovens and similar 
appliances like toaster ovens or blenders, should be considered e-waste). 
 11. CRTs refer to the video display components of older non-flat screen 
televisions and computer monitors. They contain glass tubes made with 
harmful levels of lead and barium. See, Fact Sheet: Easier Recycling of Cath-
ode Ray Tubes, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, 
http://www.epa.gov/osw/hazard/recycling/electron/crt-fs06.htm (last updated 
Nov. 15, 2012); see also Jennifer Kutz, You’ve Got Waste: The Exponentially 
Escalating Problem of Hazardous E-Waste, 17 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 307, 308 
(2006). 
 12. See CAL. DEP’T OF RESOURCES RECYCLING AND RECOVERY, supra note 10. 
 13. Betsy M. Billinghurst, E-Waste: A Comparative Analysis of Current 
and Contemplated Management Efforts by the European Union and the Unit-
ed States, 16 COLO. J. INT’L ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 399, 400 (2005). 
 14. Allie Bidwell, U.N. Seeks to Solve Growing Global E-Waste Problem, 
U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT (Dec. 16, 2013), 
http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2013/12/16/un-seeks-to-solve-growing-
global-e-waste-problem. A report by the Electronics Takeback Coalition 
states that the 2009 digital conversion of analog televisions in the United 
States will continue to contribute to e-waste production, because analog tele-
visions are no longer desirable for consumers’ reuse. In the United States 
alone, consumers dispose of more than 550,000 computers and mobile devices 
per day, based on the EPA’s 2010 findings. Facts and Figures on E-Waste and 
Recycling, ELECTRONICS TAKEBACK COALITION 6 (Sept. 25, 2013), 
http://www.electronicstakeback.com/wpcontent/uploads/Facts_and_Figures_o
n_EWaste_and_Recycling.pdf. 
 15. See Billinghurst, supra note 13, at 400. 
 16. Id. 
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their Disposal of 1989 (“Basel Convention”)17 and the proposed 
Basel Ban Amendment,18 the promulgation of various regula-
tions to manage e-waste—such as the European Union’s Waste 
Electrical and Electronic Equipment (“WEEE”) Directive19 and 
the Directive on the Restriction of the Use of Hazardous Sub-
stances (“RoHS”),20 as well as the United States’ Resource Con-
servation and Recovery Act (“RCRA”) 21—has done little to ad-
dress the growing e-waste problem or the loopholes associated 
with the Basel Convention.22 The Basel Convention also con-
flicts with international trade law as enforced by the World 
Trade Organization (“WTO”).23 Despite various efforts to regu-
late e-waste disposal, the proliferation of legislation has yielded 
unsatisfactory outcomes and has even created adverse effects.24 
Examined together, the inefficiencies of e-waste regulation ex-
emplify the findings of the “regulatory commons” as described 
by Professor William Buzbee. 25  These inefficiencies can be 
overcome by shifting the burden of regulation from weak inter-
national entities to more authoritative private actors through 
                                                                                                                            
 17. Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Haz-
ardous Wastes and Their Disposal, Mar. 22, 1989, 1673 U.N.T.S. 57 [herein-
after Basel Convention]. 
 18. The Basel Convention Ban Amendment, BASEL CONVENTION, 
http://www.basel.int/pub/baselban.html (last visited Jan. 10, 2014) [hereinaf-
ter Basel Ban Amendment]. 
 19. See generally U.S. DEP’T OF COM.’S INT’L TRADE ADMIN., WEEE: Waste 
Electrical and Electronic Equipment, EXPORT.GOV, 
http://export.gov/europeanunion/weeerohs/weeeinformation/index.asp (last 
updated May 16, 2013). 
 20. See Directive 2002/95/EC of the European Parliament and of the Coun-
cil of 27 January on the Restriction of the Use of Certain Hazardous Sub-
stances in Electrical and Electronic Equipment, 2003 O.J. (L 37), available at 
http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:32002L0095:en:HTML 
[hereinafter Directive 2002/95/EC]. 
 21. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 6901-6992k (1976). 
 22. See generally Christine Terada, Recycling Electronic Wastes in Nigeria: 
Putting Environmental and Human Rights at Risk, 10 NW. U. J. INT’L HUM. 
RTS. 154 (2012). 
 23. See generally Tanya Karina A. Lat, Testing the Limits of GATT Art. 
XX(b): Toxic Waste Trade, Japan’s Economic Partnership Agreements, and the 
WTO, 21 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 367 (2009). 
 24. Terada, supra note 22. 
 25. William W. Buzbee, Recognizing the Regulatory Commons: A Theory of 
Regulatory Gaps, 89 IOWA L. REV. 1 (2003). 
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democratic experimentation analogous to Japan’s Specified 
Home Appliance Recycling Law (“SHAR”).26 
The regulatory commons is a reinterpretation of the classic 
paradox of the tragedy of the commons,27 in which a natural 
resource is exploited due to lack of regulation and accountabil-
ity; in the regulatory commons, however, regulation itself is the 
overexploited resource.28 Overregulation poses regulatory chal-
lenges and, ironically, gives rise to decentralization mecha-
nisms that actually enable more effective regulation.29 The co-
existence of multiple forms of regulation often produces prob-
lems, including “jurisdictional mismatch” 30  and “regulatory 
fragmentation.”31 Furthermore, in contrast to the tragedy of 
the commons, in the regulatory commons there is rarely a sin-
gle government regulator. 32  Applying the framework of the 
                                                                                                                            
 26. Japan implemented The Home Appliance Recycling Act in 2001 and it 
is known by the acronym “SHAR” because it was originally named the “Speci-
fied Home Appliance Recycling Law.” Catherine K. Lin, Linan Yan & Andrew 
N. Davis, Globalization, Extended Producer Responsibility and the Problem of 
Discarded Computers in China: An Exploratory Proposal for Environmental 
Protection, 14 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 525, 541-42 (2002). 
 27. The tragedy of the commons is commonly used to characterize envi-
ronmental resource management problems, as first put forth in Garrett Har-
din’s seminal paper. In the classic tragedy of the commons, each private ac-
tor, for example, as a fisherman, has an incentive to catch as many fish as 
possible. The unchecked pursuit of self-interest, however, under circumstanc-
es where a given resource (e.g., fish) is finite, leads to overexploitation of the 
resource. Over time, resource extraction (e.g., fishing) exceeds the reproduc-
tion and replacement rates, which in turn leads to the depletion of fish stocks 
and the ultimate failure of fishing businesses. Hardin proposes that private 
property rights in a resource help actors avoid such market failure because 
property rights incentivize the holders of those rights to manage the resource 
sustainably, leading to optimal, long-term productivity of the resource. Gar-
rett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968). 
 28. Buzbee, supra note 25. 
 29. Id. 
 30. See JAMES E. KRIER & EDMUND URSIN, POLLUTION AND POLICY: A CASE 
ESSAY ON THE CALIFORNIA AND FEDERAL EXPERIENCE WITH MOTOR VEHICLE AIR 
POLLUTION, 1940-1975 (1977) (explaining that the lack of a prime or tradi-
tional regulator leads to political inattention and duplication of regulation). 
See also Daniel C. Esty, Toward Optimal Environmental Governance, 74 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1495, 1538 (1999) (noting that jurisdictional mismatches exist 
between the breadth of government authorities’ reach and the scope of public 
goods they deliver). 
 31. See Jonathan Baert Wiener, Global Environmental Regulation: In-
strument Choice in Legal Context, 108 YALE L.J. 677, 701-04 (1999). 
 32. Buzbee, supra note 25, at 9. 
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regulatory commons, this Note proposes that in the context of 
the growing e-waste stream, decentralization, while counterin-
tuitive at first glance, is a better approach to effectively pro-
moting human and environmental health because it capitalizes 
on solutions inherent in the regulatory commons. 
Part I provides an overview of e-waste, its harmful effects on 
the developing world, the backdrop for e-waste regulation, and 
the weaknesses of e-waste regulation as embodied in the Basel 
Convention, the proposed Basel Ban Amendment, the WEEE 
and RoHS Directives in the European Union, and RCRA in the 
United States. Part II presents the paradox of the regulatory 
commons, a twist on the classic model of the tragedy of the 
commons, by showing that the regulatory opportunity is the 
overregulated resource. Part II then applies this paradox to ex-
isting e-waste regulations, including the Basel Convention, the 
proposed Basel Ban Amendment, the WEEE and RoHS Direc-
tives, and RCRA, as well as potential conflicts with the WTO’s 
trade regulation, and discusses how the proliferation of these 
regulations manifests problems of the regulatory commons. Fi-
nally, Part III proposes ways in which international environ-
mental laws can be decentralized to reconcile the regulatory 
commons paradox and more effectively regulate e-waste. 
I. BACKGROUND OF E-WASTE AND ITS REGULATION 
A. Harmful Effects of E-Waste on the Developing World 
E-waste poses significant risk to humans and the environ-
ment.33 It consists of recyclable materials, such as plastics and 
aluminum,34 as well as many toxic organic pollutants known as 
polychlorinated biphenyls (“PCBs”). This class of pollutants in-
cludes copper, gold, iron, lead, thallium, and zinc, all of which 
can lead to birth defects.35 The CRTs in computer and TV mon-
																																																																																																																												
 33. THE FRIDAY TIMES, supra note 10. 
 34. JOHN GALLAUGHER, INFORMATION SYSTEMS: A MANAGER’S GUIDE TO 
HARNESSING TECHNOLOGY § 5.8 (2010), available at 
http://www.flatworldknowledge.com/pub/information-systems-managers-
g/2374/73228. 
 35. THE FRIDAY TIMES, supra note 10. See also JOSEPH F. C. DIMENTO, THE 
GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 111 (2003) (citing a notorious 
anecdote in 1988 involving a shipment from Italy of 18,000 drums of waste, 
including PCBs and asbestos, to an “unscrupulous businessman” in Koko, 
Nigeria, which led to so many hospitalizations and premature births that 
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itors also contain lead, leading to the serious consequence of 
lead poisoning.36 Additionally, many electronics contain cadmi-
um, which is a carcinogen,37 and mercury, which, in large dos-
es, can cause neurological disorders. 38  Furthermore, plastic 
parts often contain toxic flame retardants.39 A common method 
of taking apart e-waste is to burn electronic equipment in an 
open fire in order to melt away plastics and inexpensive met-
als.40 Many disposal methods, including burning, unleash dan-
gerous carcinogens and neurotoxins, pollute water supplies, 
and lead to allergic reactions, not limited to skin and respirato-
ry tract disorders.41 The methods used in the disposal of e-
waste also release pollutants, such as black soot, carbon diox-
ide, and carbon monoxide, into the atmosphere.42 Moreover, e-
waste lying undisturbed in landfills can be just as harmful be-
cause it contains heavy metals such as copper, lead, and mer-
																																																																																																																												
Nigeria subsequently banned the importation of hazardous wastes and im-
plemented the death penalty for violations). 
 36. Approximately 75% of all CRTs disposed of in the United States are 
exported for refurbishing, but only approximately 30% are actually appropri-
ate for such refurbishing; the remainder of the CRTs are dumped. MADELEINE 
COBBING, TOXIC TECH: NOT IN OUR BACKYARD, UNCOVERING THE HIDDEN FLOWS 
OF E-WASTE, 47 (2008), available at 
http://www.greenpeace.org/international/Global/international/planet-
2/report/2008/2/not-in-our-backyard-summary.pdf. See also Childhood Lead 
Poisoning, CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/lead 
(last visited Jan. 17, 2014) (noting that lead poisoning results in serious harm 
to nearly every bodily system, as well as learning disabilities, behavioral 
problems, and even seizures, coma, and death). 
 37. Cadmium Compounds Hazard Summary, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, 
http://www.epa.gov/ttn/atw/hlthef/cadmium.html (last updated Nov. 6, 2007). 
 38. OFFICE OF POLLUTION PREVENTION & TOXIC SUBSTANCES, U.S. ENVTL. 
PROTECTION AGENCY, REPORT TO CONGRESS: POTENTIAL EXPORT OF MERCURY 
COMPOUNDS FROM THE U.S. FOR CONVERSION TO ELEMENTAL MERCURY, ix 
(2009), available at http://www.epa.gov/mercury/pdfs/mercury-rpt-to-
congress.pdf. 
 39. See SILICON VALLEY TOXICS COALITION, Just Say No to E-Waste: Back-
ground Document on Hazards and Waste from Computers, U. ARK., 
http://cmase.uark.edu/teacher/Environmental_Ed/2006%20E-
Waste%20Info/E-Waste/Just%20Say%20No%20-%20E-
Waste%20Backgrounder.pdf (last updated Jun. 9, 2006). 
 40. THE FRIDAY TIMES, supra note 10. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Mountains of Toxic E-Waste in Pakistan Are a Goldmine, GREEN 
PROPHET, (Oct. 31, 2011), http://www.greenprophet.com/2011/10/pakistan-e-
waste-goldmine/ [hereinafter Mountains of Toxic E-Waste]. 
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cury, which can leach into the soil and groundwater over 
time.43 
Developed countries have strict regulations that seek to curb 
e-waste’s damage within their borders, often dumping them in 
developing countries, which disproportionately bear the toll 
that e-waste inflicts on environmental and human health.44 
Although a number of Western countries have banned dispos-
ing of old computers in landfill sites and have required that 
they be recycled, recycling can cost “tens of dollars per comput-
er.”45 For many developed countries, the more cost-effective al-
ternative is to export old electronics to developing countries, 
where regulations on e-waste are either nonexistent or neglect-
ed.46 In Europe, for example, only one third of e-waste is treat-
ed in compliance with the WEEE Directive.47 Exporters often 
disguise illegal e-waste as “secondhand goods” and “for chari-
ties” to developing countries in Africa.48 As a result, China, In-
dia, and African countries, which can provide cheap labor and 
adhere to less stringent environmental laws, or lack such envi-
ronmental laws entirely, are the end destinations for e-waste.49 
Thus, the same countries regulating e-waste are also often the 
ones illegally exporting e-waste to the developing world.50 Nev-
ertheless, developing countries have embraced e-waste recy-
																																																																																																																												
 43. THE FRIDAY TIMES, supra note 10. 
 44. Mountains of Toxic E-Waste, supra note 42. 
 45. Richard Black, E-Waste Rules Still Being Flouted, BBC NEWS, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/sci/tech/3549763.stm. (last updated Mar. 19, 2004). 
 46. Mountains of Toxic E-Waste, supra note 42. See also Black, supra note 
45. 
 47. Jana Viktoria Nysten, EU Regulation of Electronic Waste: A Revised 
Directive Reflects Economic and Environmental Concerns, AMERICAN BAR 
ASSOCIATION: TRENDS (Sept. / Oct. 2012), 
www.americanbar.org/publications/trends/2012_13/september_october/eu_reg
ula-
tion_electronic_waste_revised_directive_reflects_economic_and_environment
al_concerns.html. 
 48. Where Does E-Waste End Up?, GREENPEACE (Feb. 24, 2009), 
www.greenpeace.org/international/en/campaigns/toxics/electronics/the-e-
waste-problem/where-does-e-waste-end-up/. 
 49. Mountains of Toxic E-Waste, supra note 42. 
 50. UNITED NATIONS ENV’T PROGRAMME, WHERE ARE WEEE IN AFRICA? 
FINDINGS FROM THE BASEL CONVENTION E-WASTE AFRICA PROGRAMME, 12 (Dec. 
2011), available at 
http://www.basel.int/Implementation/TechnicalAssistance/EWaste/EwasteAfr
icaProject/Publications/tabid/2553/Default.aspx. 
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cling for its employment opportunities and the potential to re-
cover economic value from precious metals such as copper, gold, 
silver, indium, and palladium.51
B.  Global E-Waste Regulations: An Overview 
The Basel Convention presents the foundation for interna-
tional regulation of the movement of hazardous waste from in-
dustrialized to developing countries.52 The Basel Convention 
sets forth three primary goals: 1) the minimization of hazard-
ous waste (“waste reduction principle”), 2) the disposal of waste 
close to its source of origin (“proximity principle”), and 3) the 
decrease of transboundary movement of waste.53 In an effort to 
achieve these goals, the Basel Convention establishes six rules. 
First, waste is a “bad,” as opposed to a usable and tradable 
good, that harms human and environmental health and thus 
should not be traded.54 Second, waste must be minimized at its 
source and disposed of in the state where it was created.55
Third, developed countries that originally generated the waste 
must manage its disposal in a more acceptable fashion and 
must only export waste to other countries when it is for recy-
cling and upon the prior, informed consent of the importing 
																																																																																																																												
51. Mountains of Toxic E-Waste, supra note 42. 
 52. Basel Convention, supra note 17. See also Nicola J. Templeton, The 
Dark Side of Recycling and Reusing Electronics: Is Washington’s E-Cycle Pro-
gram Adequate?, 7 SEATTLE J. SOC. JUST. 763, 766-68 (2009). 
53. About the Convention, BASEL CONVENTION, 
http://www.basel.int/convention/basics.html (last visited Jan. 17, 2014). The 
Basel Convention identifies waste either by its place of disposal or by its re-
covery process. Annexure IV of the Convention lists these various recovery 
processes. For example, almost all materials recycled or processed in order to 
recapture a metal, or an organic or inorganic substance for future use, are 
listed as waste. On the other hand, electronic components that can be used 
without further processing are not generally defined as waste. The Basel 
Convention further divides waste into two lists: List A in Annexure VII for 
“hazardous” waste that “poses serious threats to the environment and human 
health” and that requires “special handling and disposal processes,” and List 
B in Annexure IX for non-hazardous waste, which is not regulated by the 
Basel Convention. Most e-waste is categorized under List A and is subject to 
the Basel Convention.
 54. TOXICS LINK, E-WASTE IN INDIA: SYSTEM FAILURE IMMINENT-TAKE 
ACTION NOW! (2004), available at
http://www.toxicslink.org/docs/06040_repsumry.pdf. 
 55. Basel Convention, supra note 17, art. 4. 
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country. 56  Fourth, the Basel Convention acknowledges that 
countries have a “sovereign right” to ban the import, entry, or 
disposal of hazardous wastes. 57  Fifth, the Basel Convention 
bans trade between parties to the convention and nonparties.58 
Sixth, the Basel Convention bans export of hazardous wastes to 
those member states whose domestic laws prohibit the import 
of hazardous wastes.59 
Despite the Basel Convention’s noble goals, various parties 
stand to benefit economically from e-waste trade that violates 
the Basel Convention.60 For example, importers, traders, and 
recyclers have continued to exploit loopholes in the Basel Con-
vention under pretexts of e-waste disposal for recycling or re-
use. E-waste recycling is often profitable to importers because 
electronic equipment contains small quantities of valuable ma-
terials such as gold and copper that can be extracted, re-
claimed, and then resold.61 In fact, the Basel Action Network 
(“BAN”), a nonprofit group named after the Basel Convention 
and focusing on combating toxic waste, estimates that as much 
as 99% of the waste that is shipped to developing countries is to 
be recycled or reused.62 At the same time, developing countries 
lack the infrastructure needed to track the e-waste or oversee 
handling.63 Furthermore, people are often uninformed of the 
procedure to report a claim to international authorities such as 
Interpol and to take action against e-waste that is disposed of 
																																																																																																																												
 56. Id. arts. 4, 6. 
 57. Id. preamble. 
 58. Id. art. 4.5. 
 59. Id. art. 4.1.(a). The Basel Convention does, however, permit trans-
boundary movement of hazardous waste if the country of origin is unable to 
safely dispose of it. Id. art. 4.9.(a). 
 60. See Jerrold A. Long, Protocol on Liability and Compensation for Dam-
age Resulting from the Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and 
Their Disposal, 1999 COLO. J. INT’L ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 253, 254-55 (1999). For 
instance, the Basel Convention does not hold exporters liable for damages 
occurring after the importer received “operational control” of the waste. Con-
sequently, countries lack incentive to ensure that facilities exist in the im-
porting country, so that importing countries disproportionately bear the costs 
of enforcement. 
 61. Vinutha V., The E-Waste Problem, EXPRESS COMPUTER ONLINE (Nov. 
21, 2005), 
http://computer.financialexpress.com/20051121/management01.shtml. 
 62. Charles W. Schmidt, Environmental Crimes: Profiting at the Earth’s 
Expense, 112 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. 96, 101 (2004). 
 63. Id. at 102. 
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illegally.64 When authorities are unable or unwilling to oversee 
the waste and monitor illegal dumping, e-waste is dumped as 
an afterthought.65 Therefore, countries like China, India, and 
Pakistan continue to be the primary dumping grounds for e-
waste from industrialized countries.66
In 1995 developing countries sought to overcome the Basel 
Convention’s loopholes in connection with recycling and reuse 
through the Basel Ban Amendment, which seeks to ban the ex-
port of all hazardous wastes from the twenty-nine “Annex VII 
countries” (Basel Convention signatories that also belong to the 
European Union or to the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (“OECD”))67 to the non-Annex VII 
countries (all other signatories to the Basel Convention).68 If 
implemented, the Basel Ban Amendment would ensure that 
developed countries keep e-waste within their own borders, and 
would effectively shift the burden from developing countries—
to turn away imports of hazardous wastes—to industrialized 
countries—to prevent such exports.69 Nevertheless, the Basel 
Ban Amendment has not taken effect because it has not yet 
met the Basel Convention’s requirement for ratification by 
three-fourths of Basel Convention parties.70 In fact, when the 
Basel Ban Amendment was proposed, Greenpeace, a leading 
non-governmental organization dedicated to environmental 
protection, labeled several developed countries the “sinister 
seven” for they were key opponents of the Basel Ban Amend-
ment.71 Against this backdrop of the failures of the Basel Con-
																																																																																																																												
64. Id. at 98. 
65. Id. at 98. 
 66. Vinutha, supra note 61. 
 67. The OECD is a coalition of thirty-two countries focused on democracy 
and the free market. ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., 
http://www.oecd.org/ (last visited Jan. 10, 2014). 
 68. Basel Ban Amendment, supra note 18. 
69. Id. 
 70. The Basel Ban Amendment requires sixty-six country ratifications, 
representing three-fourths of the eighty-seven parties present at the Third 
Meeting of the Conference of the Parties, to take effect. Despite the fifty-one 
ratifications, the issue as to when the Basel Ban Amendment shall enter into 
force remains controversial. Ban Ratification Deposit Box, BASEL ACTION 
NETWORK, http://www.ban.org/deposit-box/ (last updated Mar. 27, 2013). 
 71. These countries are: Australia, Canada, Germany, Japan, the Nether-
lands, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Jim Puckett & Cathy Fo-
gel, A Victory for Environment and Justice: The Basel Ban and How it Hap-
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vention, global regulations have proliferated and aim to tackle 
e-waste disposal. These additional regulations, however, actu-
ally exacerbate the problem by fostering the exploitation of a 
resource, namely regulation itself. This exploitation is mani-
fested by the paradox of the regulatory commons. 
The EU’s enactment of the WEEE Directive in January 2003 
represents the first significant producer takeback, or Extended 
Producer Responsibility (“EPR”), program,72 along with the re-
cent WEEE Recast Directive in July 2012.73 Both measures, 
however, fall short of achieving their intended goals. The 
WEEE Directive mandates that private sector producers fund 
and coordinate collection facilities for consumers to properly 
dispose of or recycle e-waste at no cost to the consumer.74 On its 
face, the WEEE Directive is a blanket regulation covering all e-
waste, regardless of its source or quantity.75 Ideally, the WEEE 
Directive would shift the entire burden of e-waste recycling and 
disposal to the original producers and compel manufacturers, 
retailers, consumers, waste operators, and the government to 
participate in all steps of the waste recovery process.76 Addi-
																																																																																																																												
pened, BASEL ACTION NETWORK (1994), 
http://ban.org/about_basel_ban/a_victory.html. 
 72. EPR places the onus on producers to provide for the long-term envi-
ronmental responsibility of their products in a “cradle-to-grave” chain, from 
production to distribution to recycling, reuse, and sustainable product design. 
Noah Sachs, Planning the Funeral at the Birth: Extended Producer Responsi-
bility in the European Union and the United States, 30 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 
53, 53, 65-69 (2006). Before 2003, the EU’s e-waste management landscape 
was similar to the present situation in the United States, in that there was 
no comprehensive e-waste policy, although some EU countries such as Bel-
gium, Denmark, Germany (e.g. Packaging Ordinance legislation enacted in 
1991), Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden had such manufacturer 
takeback policies before 2003. 
 73. See generally U.S. DEP’T OF COM.’S INT’L TRADE ADMIN., WEEE: Waste 
Electrical and Electronic Equipment, supra note 19. 
 74. See Council Directive 2002/96, art. 5, 2003 O.J. (L 37) 24-25 (EC), 
available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32002L0096; Kutz, supra note 11, at 321; 
Phoenix Pak, Haste Makes E-Waste: A Comparative Analysis of How the U.S. 
Should Approach the Growing E-Waste Threat, 16 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. 
L. 241, 271 (2008). 
 75. See Sachs, supra note 72, at 77 (discussing how the WEEE Directive 
mandates that manufacturers take back all household appliances and electric 
tools, among other wastes). 
 76. See Promoting and Practicing Environmental Stewardship for Elec-
tronic Products, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, 
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tionally, the WEEE Recast Directive seeks to expand the scope 
of the original WEEE Directive, strengthen takeback programs, 
increase EU member states’ waste collection rates, and stream-
line registration and reporting requirements, among other 
goals.77 Nevertheless, the effectiveness of the WEEE Directive 
and the WEEE Recast Directive are undermined by inconsist-
encies.78
The European Union also sought to structure the WEEE Di-
rective to create ways for manufacturers to develop more envi-
ronmentally friendly electronics and implemented the RoHS 
Directive in February 2003, in tandem with the WEEE Di-
rective, to ensure that hazardous materials are removed from 
electronic devices.79 The RoHS Directive mandated that manu-
facturers cease using six substances in electronic goods sold 
within the European Union by 2006: lead, mercury, cadmium, 
hexavalent chromium, polybrominated bi-phenyls, and 
polybrominated diphenyl ethers.80 Similarly to the WEEE Di-
																																																																																																																												
http://www.epa.gov/wastes/conserve/tools/stewardship/products/electronics.ht
m (last updated June 28, 2013); Rob Courtney, Evolving Hazardous Waste 
Policy for the Digital Era, 25 STAN. ENVTL. L. J. 199, 216 (2006). 
 77. In particular, the WEEE Recast Directive provides a transition period, 
from August 13, 2012 to August 14, 2018, to expand the scope of the WEEE 
Directive to all electrical and electronic equipment. The WEEE Recast Di-
rective also requires distributors to set up collection stations at retail loca-
tions at no charge to end-users, and sets a target for a minimum collection 
rate of 45% starting in 2016 to 65% in 2019. New Recast WEEE Directive 
(2012/19/EU) Published, INTERTEK, 
http://www.intertek.com/consumer/news/v110-new-recast-weee-directive/ 
(last visited April 9, 2014); See also U.S. DEP’T OF COM.’S INT’L TRADE ADMIN.,
supra note 73. 
78. See Pak, supra note 74, at 262. 
 79. Catherine Day, Frequently Asked Questions on Directive 2002/95/EC 
on the Restriction of the Use of Certain Hazardous Substances in Electrical 
and Electronic Equipment (RoHS) and Directive 2002/96/EC on Waste Elec-
trical and Electronic Equipment (WEEE), EUROPEAN COMMISSION DIRECTOR-
GENERAL ENV’T, http://ec.europa.eu/environment/waste/weee/pdf/faq_weee.pdf 
(last updated Aug. 2006); See Directive 2002/95/EC, supra note 20. 
 80. The RoHS Directive banned the use of these six substances by both 
manufacturers within the European Union and manufacturers who imported 
electronic goods into the EU. The RoHS Directive, however, allows exceptions 
for the use of the six banned substances when it is “technically or scientifical-
ly impracticable” to replace the banned substance with a substitute or when 
the use of a substitute would result in “negative environmental, health and/or 
consumer safety impacts” likely to outweigh any benefits derived from the 
ban. For instance, the RoHS Directive makes exceptions for the use of lead in 
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rective, the EU recast the RoHS Directive (“RoHS II”)81 and ex-
panded the scope of the original RoHS Directive to all electron-
ic equipment, cables, and spare parts by 2019.82 In effect, RoHS 
II seeks to establish “improvements in implementation, en-
forcement and coherence.”83 Although most electronics manu-
facturers have been able to modify products to satisfy the RoHS 
Directive,84 the RoHS Directive and RoHS II’s strict mandate, 
in combination with the WEEE Directive, manifest the chal-
lenges of the regulatory commons. Collectively, the RoHS and 
WEEE Directives reduce the sense of social need in regulatory 
actors charged with their enforcement. 
In the United States, RCRA was enacted in 1976 to oversee 
creation and disposal of waste.85 In pertinent part, RCRA ex-
empts the export of potentially hazardous e-waste from any ex-
port controls to other countries by claiming it is intended for 
recycling.86 Additionally, RCRA states that equipment with the 
																																																																																																																												
glass components of CRTs because there is no suitable alternative. Council 
Directive 2011/65, art. 2, 2011 O.J. (L 174) 5 (EU) (delineating the scope of 
products affected by the RoHS Directive, which does not include devices with 
medical or military applications). See also Directive 2002/95/EC, supra note 
20, art. 4. 
 81. U.S. DEP’T OF COM.’S INT’L TRADE ADMIN, RoHS: Restriction of the use of 
Certain Hazardous Substances, EXPORT.GOV, 
http://export.gov/europeanunion/weeerohs/rohsinformation/index.asp (last 
updated May 16, 2013). 
 82. The original RoHS Directive only applied to several categories of elec-
trical and electronic equipment, such as household appliances and consumer 
equipment. Press Release, EUROPEAN COMMISSION, Environment: Fewer Risks 
from Hazardous Substances in Electrical and Electronic Equipment (July 20, 
2011) available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-11-912_en.htm. 
 83. Memorandum from the European Commission, EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 
Questions and Answers on the Revised Directive on Restrictions of Certain 
Dangerous Substances in Electrical and Electronic Equipment (RoHS) (Dec. 
3, 2008) available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-08-
763_en.htm. RoHS II also promotes better compliance with the new REACH 
legislation (The Registration, Evaluation, Authorisation and Restriction of 
Chemicals), which was promulgated in 2006 for the marketing of products in 
the EU. Press Release, EUROPEAN COMMISSION, supra note 82.  
 84. The RoHS Directive has led to more investment by manufacturers into 
research and development in order to develop new, cleaner designs and man-
ufacturing techniques, and to clean up devices sold worldwide. Kutz, supra 
note 11, at 328. See also Sachs, supra note 72, at 93-94. 
 85. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 6901-6992k (1976), supra note 21. 
 86. Nisha Thakker, India’s Toxic Landfills: A Dumping Ground for the 
World’s Electronic Waste, 6 SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. & POL’Y 58, 60 (2006). 
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“potential for reuse” is not waste, so many electronic products 
at the end of their usable life cycle are not classified as “waste” 
and are therefore excluded from the RCRA regulation.87 The 
reach of RCRA is further limited by the EPA’s narrow defini-
tion of “hazardous.”88 Additionally, RCRA only covers materials 
that emit dangerous chemicals during their use, so electronics 
and harmful e-waste are generally excluded, 89  even though 
they harm human and environmental health after the end of 
their life cycle. 
Unfortunately, a 2004 gathering convened by the EPA fur-
ther reinforced the fact that RCRA can no longer control to-
day’s overwhelming, and ever increasing, e-waste stream,90 a 
fact which could not have been anticipated at the time RCRA 
was enacted. To date, there is no nationwide e-waste recycling 
or safe disposal law in the United States.91 Even if RCRA were 
fully relevant, it is undermined by conflicting overlap with EPA 
regulations. For example, RCRA is only enforced against large 
businesses, not private consumers and small businesses. 92 
																																																																																																																												
 87. Robert Tonetti, EPA Office of Solid Waste, EPA’s Regulatory Program 
for “E-Waste” (Oct. 2007), available at 
http://www.epa.gov/waste/conserve/materials/ecycling/docs/e-wasteregs.pdf. 
 88. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 8. 
 89. Even though the EPA now considers CRT computer monitors to be 
hazardous, for many years CRT computer monitors were not registered on 
Toxicity Characteristic Leachate Procedure (“TCLP”) lead toxicity tests. 
Courtney, supra note 76, at 205-06. 
 90. OFFICE OF TECH. POL’Y, U.S. DEPT. COMMERCE, RECYCLING TECHNOLOGY 
PRODUCTS: AN OVERVIEW OF E-WASTE POLICY ISSUES 3-4 (2006), available at 
http://www.bvsde.paho.org/bvsacd/cd57/recycling/intro.pdf. The National 
Electronics Product Stewardship Initiative (“NESPI”) brought stakeholders 
in waste disposal together, including state and local governments, recyclers, 
and environmental organizations. NESPI recognized the need for a national 
law to better manage waste but no consensus has been reached on a financ-
ing method for such regulation. 
 91. Mark Anderson, Electronics Waste Programs Ineffective in Most U.S. 
States, INSTITUTE OF ELECTRICAL AND ELECTRONICS ENGINEERS (Sept. 11, 
2013), http://spectrum.ieee.org/energy/environment/electronics-waste-
programs-ineffective-in-most-us-states. In 2010, the EPA partnered with the 
United Nations’ StEP Initiative and executed a cooperative agreement in 
November 2010. Cleaning Up Electronic Waste (E-Waste), ENVTL. PROTECTION 
AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/oiamount/toxics/ewaste/index-
uew.html#national (last updated Dec. 16, 2013). 
 92. See 40 C.F.R §261.4(b)(1) (2010) (exclusion for household waste); 40 
C.F.R. §261.5(f)(3) (2010) (conditional exclusion for companies that produce 
less than 100 kilograms of hazardous waste per month). See also Sachs, supra 
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RCRA “has exempted more and more toxic wastes simply be-
cause they allegedly destined for recycling operations”93 or to 
other economically challenged institutions that take these 
wastes in the guise of “donations.”94 Organizations that take 
public donations like Goodwill and the Salvation Army are re-
luctant to accept discarded computers because of high disposal 
costs. 95  Taken together, the loopholes present in RCRA en-
forcement manifest regulatory fragmentation in e-waste con-
trol. 
Thus, this Note proposes that global regulators may improve 
the effectiveness of environmental laws by adopting the lessons 
of the regulatory commons to create economic incentives for e-
waste producers, recyclers, and consumers alike, while ena-
bling states, especially in the developing world, to better pro-
tect human and environmental safety. In the particular context 
of the growing e-waste stream, this Note suggests that, while 
counterintuitive at first glance, decentralization may be a bet-
ter approach to effectively promoting human and environmen-
tal health. 
II. THE PARADOX OF THE REGULATORY COMMONS 
A. The Classic Tragedy of the Commons: The Regulatory Com-
mons 
The regulatory commons is a variation on the classic para-
digm of the tragedy of the commons. In the tragedy of the 
commons, rational, individual actors overuse a resource that no 
one individual owns or controls, resulting in the destruction of 
each individual’s long-term interest.96 This overused resource is 
																																																																																																																												
note 72, at 58 (noting that U.S. households produce over 1.6 million tons of 
hazardous waste annually). 
 93. Thakker, supra note 86, at 60 (citing a 2002 report from BAN). 
 94. Manasvini Krishna & Pratiksha Kulshrestha, The Toxic Belt: Perspec-
tives on E-Waste Dumping in Developing Nations, 15 U.C. DAVIS J. INT’L L. & 
POL’Y 71, 88 (2008). E-waste is dumped in the guise of “donations” on develop-
ing countries that lack the financial resources to oversee proper disposal. The 
Indian embassy in the United States even encourages donations of old com-
puters to schools run by the Indian government. 
 95. Heather L. Drayton, Economics of Electronic Waste Disposal Regula-
tions, 36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 149, 159 (2007). 
 96. Buzbee is the first to engage in serious exploration of the existence of 
the “regulatory commons.” See Buzbee, supra note 25. Other legal scholars 
have only referenced the concept in passing. See, e.g., William A. Fischel, Vot-
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called a “fugitive resource” and each actor uses that resource in 
a way that most immediately benefits him or herself.97 In the 
long run, the actors in the tragedy of the commons overuse and 
deplete the particular resource.98 The traditional solution, in 
theory, is to privatize property by creating property rights so 
that individual actors can better manage externalities, share 
information, and reduce transaction costs.99 
The regulatory commons centers on regulation itself, also 
known as the “regulatory opportunity,” as the overused re-
source, in lieu of some natural resource that is vulnerable to 
depletion.100 Whereas the tragedy of the commons assumes that 
the actor is a rational individual motivated by monetary inter-
ests, the regulatory commons assumes that the government 
actor is not only motivated by monetary interests but also by 
electoral, ideological, and political interests.101 Such symptoms 
																																																																																																																												
ing, Risk Aversion, and the NIMBY Syndrome: A Comment on Robert Nelson’s 
“Privatizing the Neighborhood,” 7 GEO. MASON L. REV. 881, 896-97 (1999) (not-
ing that local governments tend to overregulate and that the Takings Clause 
of the U.S. Constitution deters “local governments [from] devolv[ing] into a 
kind of regulatory commons, in which each knows that its behavior may be 
harmful to the larger area, but none has the incentive to mend its ways on its 
own”); Thomas W. Merrill, Golden Rules for Transboundary Pollution, 46 
DUKE L.J. 931, 985 (1997) (noting that any legal government system is akin 
to “a kind of regulatory commons, where effective action is dependent upon 
alliances of groups overcoming collective action barriers and pressuring ad-
ministrators to respond.”). 
 97. See generally H. Scott Gordon, The Economic Theory of a Common-
Property Resource: The Fishery, 62 J. POL. ECON. 124 (1954), reprinted in JOHN 
A. BADEN & DOUGLAS S. NOONAN, MANAGING THE COMMONS 17 (2d ed. 1998); 
Hardin, supra note 27. 
 98. See, e.g., Carol M. Rose, Energy and Efficiency in the Realignment of 
Common-Law Water Rights, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 261 (1990). 
 99. Completely privatized rights in a resource prone to depletion, however, 
still rely on robust legal frameworks to maintain and enforce those rights 
through judicial and regulatory regimes. They also introduce new costs of 
creating and policing the private property regime and the tradeoff with a 
community property system. James E. Krier, The Tragedy of the Commons, 
Part Two, 15 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 325, 332-35 (1992) (citing Harold Dem-
setz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 347 (Papers & 
Proc. 1967)). 
 100. Buzbee, supra note 25, at 22. 
 101. See DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A 
CRITICAL INTRODUCTION 21-33 (1991). See also Joseph P. Kalt & Mark A. 
Zupan, The Apparent Ideological Behavior of Legislators: Testing for Princi-
pal-Agent Slack in Political Institutions, 33 J.L. ECON. 103, 108 (1990) (dis-
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are already present in laws aimed to manage such varied re-
sources as aquaculture,102 urban sprawl,103 global warming,104 
and bioengineered foods.105 For instance, aquaculture involves 
an industry where conflicting regulation over harvesters of 
ocean and river resources creates a state in which individual 
fishers are unable to privatize property and consequently are 
unable to exclude other fishers from taking the resource.106 
Overuse of the regulatory opportunity in the regulatory 
commons poses a range of legal and societal problems.107 Con-
sider, for example, the problem of “jurisdictional mismatch.”108 
When no regulator has primacy over other regulators of the 
regulated activity (such as the lack of a central government ex-
erting power over local governments and administrative agen-
cies), regulators experience mass political inattention and ac-
tually neglect the underlying problem.109 Additionally, “regula-
																																																																																																																												
cussing how legislators’ ideology is “the most potent explanatory variable” 
used in evaluating legislators’ actions). 
 102. On a domestic level, in the United States, there is no clear primary 
regulator. Jurisdiction is shared by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, the 
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, the Fish and Wildlife Service, and the 
Food and Drug Administration, as well as state and local fisheries and wild-
life agencies. See Erin R. Englebrecht, Can Aquaculture Continue to Circum-
vent the Regulatory Net of the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and 
Management Act?, 51 EMORY L.J. 1187, 1199-1207 (2002). 
 103. Again, on a domestic level in the United States, urban sprawl contin-
ues to be a problem but various forms of political action on the state level 
have not been effective in addressing the issue. See, e.g., William W. Buzbee, 
Sprawl’s Dynamics: A Comparative Institutional Analysis Critique, 35 WAKE 
FOREST L. REV. 509 (2000). 
 104. The United States remains the only signatory of the Kyoto Protocol 
that has not yet ratified the convention. Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change, art. 3, Dec. 10, 1997, U.N. Doc 
FCCC/CP/1997/7/Add.1, 37 I.L.M. 22 (1998), available at 
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/kpeng.pdf. Despite executive orders 
such as the Clear Skies and Global Climate Change Initiatives released in 
2002, little has been done in the United States to comply with the Kyoto Pro-
tocol. See NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., President Bush Visits 
NOAA, NATIONAL CLIMATIC DATA CENTER (Feb. 14, 2002), 
http://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/oa/trends.html) (last updated Aug. 20, 2008). 
 105. See THOMAS O. MCGARITY AND PATRICIA HANSEN, BREEDING DISTRUST: 
AN ASSESSMENT AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVING THE REGULATION OF 
PLANT-DERIVED GENETICALLY MODIFIED FOODS (2001). 
 106. See Englebrecht, supra note 102, at 1190-91 (defining aquaculture). 
 107. Buzbee, supra note 25. 
 108. See also Esty, supra note 30, at 1538. 
 109. See KRIER & URSIN, supra note 30. 
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tory fragmentation” arises from the lack of centralization and 
the prevalence of loopholes in the existing but disconnected 
regulations.110 Furthermore, existing regulation may “overlap” 
or create conflicts among jurisdictions both geographically and 
at different jurisdictional levels of regulation.111 Consequently, 
regulators may experience a reduced perception of social ur-
gency and are less able to recognize and respond to ineffective 
regulations. 112  These challenges are more severe where the 
government is either smaller or, in some cases, larger than the 
underlying resource that is being overly regulated because the 
poor fit exacerbates the mismatch between legal control and 
the regulatory resource in question.113 A tendency to maintain 
the status quo shapes behavior and suppresses change. 114 
Moreover, government actors actually compete to attract or 
keep businesses and offer regulatory ease as a carrot, resulting 
in a race to the bottom, where each regulatory authority actual-
ly provides less protection than it would if it were acting inde-
pendently.115 
                                                                                                                            
 110. See Wiener, supra note 31, at 701-04. 
 111. James M. Buchanan & Yong J. Yoon, Symmetric Tragedies: Commons 
and Anticommons, 43 J.L. & ECON. 1, 11 (2000) (noting effects of overlapping 
agencies in environmental laws). 
 112. Christopher H. Schroeder, Rational Choice Versus Republican Moment 
Explanations for Environmental Laws, 1969-73, 9 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 
29, 30 and 49-52 (1998). 
 113. Oceans represent an example where the government is smaller than 
the resource that is threatened. At the same time, a particular resource may 
be highly localized so that an expansive government may not effectively regu-
late it. Buzbee, supra note 25, at 25. 
 114. Interest groups often try to maintain the status quo, and act in reli-
ance on misconceptions derived from mental shortcuts (the availability heu-
ristic). See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON 
LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 798-99 (3d ed. 
2001). This can be seen in how United States government policy has allocated 
public goods such as offshore oil reserves (drilling leases), radio and television 
airwaves (FCC broadcast frequencies), the air (pollution rights), and various 
oil and natural gas quotas. See Elizabeth S. Rolph, Government Allocation of 
Property Rights: Who Gets What?, 3 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 45, 47-49 
(1983). 
 115. See Richard L. Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: Rethink-
ing the “Race-to-the-Bottom” Rationale for Federal Environmental Regulation, 
67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1210, 1221-24 (1992); Kirsten H. Engel, State Environmen-
tal Standard-Setting: Is There a “Race” and Is It “to the Bottom”?, 48 
HASTINGS L.J. 271 (1997). 
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B. Application of the Regulatory Commons to Existing E-Waste 
Regulation
The Basel Convention is a perfect example of regulatory 
fragmentation. As of this writing, 179 nations had adopted the 
Basel Convention, yet the United States is the only developed 
country in the world that has not done so.116 Furthermore, the 
United States is one of three nations worldwide to have signed 
but not ratified the Convention.117 The other two countries are 
Haiti and Afghanistan, but neither has the gravitas that the 
United States carries in the global arena. 118  Moreover, the 
United States is the biggest producer of waste and thus poten-
tially the largest violator of the Basel Convention.119 In effect, 
the United States’ signing but not ratifying the Basel Conven-
tion undermines the authority and effectiveness of the Basel 
Convention in other countries. In fact, the United States used 
its leverage as a signatory to weaken the Convention and pre-
vent a complete ban on all exports of hazardous waste to devel-
oping nations. 120 At the same time, developing countries lack 
sufficient institutional and legal frameworks to enforce obliga-
tions of multinational treaties or cannot do so effectively in col-
laboration with developed countries.121
As a result of regulatory fragmentation, the Basel Conven-
tion faces challenges of poor implementation and enforce-
ment.122 Many Basel members claim that they have been una-
ble to comply with the Basel Convention because of limited re-
sources, lack of staff, poor training, low public awareness, and 
																																																																																																																												
116. Parties to the Basel Convention, BASEL CONVENTION (May 5, 1992), 
http://www.basel.int/ratif/convention.htm. 
 117. Templeton, supra note 52, at 795.
118. Id.
 119. China is the world’s largest emitter of carbon dioxide, though the Unit-
ed States still consumes six times as much energy per capita as does China. 
Kristi Heim, Can a Bold New “Eco-City” Clear the Air in China?, THE
SEATTLE TIMES, Nov. 25, 2007, at A18. 
 120. Templeton, supra note 52, at 794-95; THE DIGITAL DUMP, supra note 9. 
 121. Greenpeace claimed that the Basel Convention should be considered 
criminal activity. BASEL ACTION NETWORK, THE BASEL BAN: A TRIUMPH FOR 
GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE (2012), available at http://www.ban.org/wp-
content/uploads/2012/09/BP1_Sept2012Final_A4.pdf (noting that several Af-
rican nations refused to sign the weakened Convention and instead preferred 
to create their own treaty banning the import of hazardous waste to Africa). 
 122. Schmidt, supra note 62, at 98. 
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porous border controls.123 Unsurprisingly, with the exception of 
the United States, countries with the most violations—namely 
of the restrictions on export of hazardous wastes—are poorer 
and have fewer resources. Thus, they are more vulnerable to 
illegal e-waste dumping and to toxic waste that is imported 
under the false pretext of recycling.124 At least one-third of the 
Basel Convention’s members cannot enforce their treaty obliga-
tions due to a complete inability to prevent illegal waste im-
ports.125 Therefore, in 1995 the global community worked to 
boost the Basel Convention’s effectiveness by seeking to adopt 
the Basel Ban Amendment, which would place a complete ban 
on the export of hazardous wastes from wealthy OECD coun-
tries to poor non-OECD countries.126 
Nevertheless, as in the case of the Basel Convention, the Ba-
sel Ban Amendment represents another example of regulatory 
fragmentation. The Basel Ban Amendment’s status has been 
severely eroded by the United States, which has not only failed 
to ratify the Basel Ban Amendment, but also worked to reverse 
it. 127  Admittedly, to date, many Basel Convention members 
have adopted the Basel Ban Amendment, including EU coun-
tries that have joined together under independent EU initia-
tives meant to address hazardous waste exports and e-waste 
issues, such as the WEEE Directive.128 Nevertheless, at the 
same time, the Basel Ban Amendment may hurt developing 
countries that currently trade in e-waste by reducing these 
countries’ access to affordable electronics, deepening the digital 
                                                                                                                            
 123. Id. at 101. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. (noting that countries claim, as causes for noncompliance, “a lack of 
resources, training, staff, expertise, and public awareness, … [and] lax border 
controls.”). 
 126. See Basel Convention Ban Amendment, supra note 18. 
 127. BASEL ACTION NETWORK, THE BASEL BAN AMENDMENT: ENTRY INTO 
FORCE = NOW! (2007), available at http://ban.org/library/BP4_09_07.pdf (ex-
plaining that many countries need to ratify the Basel Ban Amendment for it 
to take effect, how e-waste policies of the United States and Canada are inad-
equate and led to social injustice against developing nations, and that the 
United States and Canada actively oppose the Basel Ban Amendment). 
 128. Templeton, supra note 52, at 795 (noting that France, Germany, and 
the United Kingdom have adopted the Basel Ban Amendment). 
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divide between developing and developed countries. 129 Fur-
thermore, the Basel Ban Amendment only prohibits the export 
of hazardous waste to non-OECD countries and does not pre-
vent the export of clean electronics.130 Therefore, the effective-
ness of the Basel Convention and the Basel Ban Amendment 
are undermined by the very regulatory fragmentation that they 
created. 
Other examples of the challenges of the regulatory com-
mons—regulatory fragmentation and overlap—can be seen in 
the EU’s legislation regarding e-waste disposal. Inconsistencies 
among various member states’ regulations embody the concept 
of regulatory fragmentation while also creating new transac-
tion costs.131 For instance, a key weakness of the WEEE Di-
rective is the resulting costs incurred by their manufacturers in 
recycling individual devices and tracking quantities of returned 
goods.132 Similarly, the RoHS Directive actually causes elec-
tronics manufacturers to make products of an inferior quality 
by substituting less effective component parts so as to abide by 
the ban on restricted substances.133 The RoHS Directive also 
hurts the public by forcing manufacturers to rely on underde-
veloped or untested technologies and materials, which may be 
unreliable or even more harmful to the environment and public 
health than the banned substances.134 These effects exacerbate 
the e-waste problem by encouraging manufacturers to opt for 
collective recycling instead of actively managing the e-waste 
that they produce.135 Faced with such a complex regulatory 
																																																																																																																												
129. Id. at 796 (noting that if the United States were to ratify the Basel 
Convention, such action would influence countries such as Canada and Aus-
tralia to follow suit). 
130. Id.
131. See Pak, supra note 74, at 261. 
132. Id.
133. Id. at 264-65 (noting that manufacturers originally chose to use the 
banned substances because they were best suited for their particular purpos-
es, and that substitute materials would not have provided the same results). 
134. See Commission Decision 2005/618, 2005 O.J. (L 214) 65, para. (1), 
available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:32005D0618:EN:NOT 
(amending Directive 2002/95/EC to allow for “certain concentration values” of 
banned substances). See also Pak, supra note 74, at 264-66 (noting that re-
strictions on lead caused the formation of “tin whiskers,” which can cause 
failures in electrical circuits and indirectly led to the shutdown of a nuclear 
power plant in Connecticut in 2005). 
135. Id. at 262. 
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framework, EU manufacturers are forced to export their e-
waste overseas in order to avoid compliance with EU regula-
tions.136
Also at play in relation to the WEEE Directive are the “race 
to the bottom” effects of the regulatory commons.137 For in-
stance, China is a popular importing nation for WEEE coun-
tries because of its cheap labor and low environmental stand-
ards. 138 Taken a step further, the race to the bottom effects of 
the regulatory commons actually endow China with a competi-
tive economic advantage at the cost of environmental and 
health risks. The WEEE Directive also allows member states to 
place “collective” responsibility on industries rather than “indi-
vidual” responsibility on each manufacturer, so that manufac-
turers do not actually manage the recycling and disposal costs 
of their own products.139 Additionally, the WEEE Directive al-
lows manufacturers to pay a flat fee to recycle, so manufactur-
ers have little incentive to design electronics in ways that min-
imize use of harmful materials, that have a longer usable life, 
or that allow them to be disposed of or recycled more easily.140
Furthermore, the WEEE Directive only sets minimum re-
																																																																																																																												
 136. Article 6 of the WEEE Directive permits manufacturers to export e-
waste outside of the European Union as long they can demonstrate that the 
receiving importer will process e-waste in compliance with the WEEE’s 
standards. Council Directive 2002/96, supra note 74, art. 6. 
137. See Revesz, supra note 115; Engel, supra note 115. A “race to the bot-
tom” results when competition leads each regulatory authority to provide less 
protection than it would if each acted independently. 
 138. A study demonstrates that the cost of recycling a computer is “approx-
imately US$0.38 per pound in the United States, but only US$0.15 to 
US$0.30 per pound overseas,” including all transportation and handling 
costs. Catherine K. Lin, Linan Yan & Andrew N. Davis, Globalization, Ex-
tended Producer Responsibility and the Problem of Discarded Computers in 
China: An Exploratory Proposal for Environmental Protection, 14 GEO. INT’L
ENVTL. L. REV. 525, 533 (2002). 
 139. “Individual” responsibility refers to a situation in which manufacturers 
manage products they actually produce, whereas “collective” responsibility 
refers to a situation in which all manufacturers within an industry must col-
lectively manage all e-waste, regardless of whether it arises from a product 
that a particular manufacturer produced. Council Directive 2002/96, supra
note 74, art. 8. 
 140. Article 8 of the WEEE Directive allows manufacturers to use collective 
e-waste management systems and establish common funds that pay a third-
party to manage the disposal and recycling of used electronics returned by 
the public. Id. 
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quirements and allows all twenty-eight member states141 indi-
vidual autonomy in establishing additional mandates.142 Alt-
hough the WEEE Recast Directive seeks to harmonize registra-
tion, it fails to prescribe labeling requirements and allows EU 
Member States great leeway in establishing what information 
must be provided for the proper disposal of their products.143
Thus, in the regulatory commons, competing governments im-
plement policies in a defensive manner rather than with well-
reasoned planning.144
Similarly, the regulatory commons’ jurisdictional mismatch 
also cripples current U.S. law on both a domestic and interna-
tional level. On the federal level, the EPA has been unable to 
carry out aggressive regulatory controls to implement RCRA.145
A report by the EPA further underscores that, to date, the 
United States has not adopted federal regulations to specifical-
ly handle domestic management or export of e-waste.146 At the 
same time, on the state level, the presence of various forms of 
legislation results in overlap and creates conflicting waste reg-
ulation schemes.147 These regulations can best be characterized 
as a “patchwork” of inconsistent and often counterproductive 
policies.148 In fact, nearly all types of e-waste are freely export-
ed from the United States; the EPA only maintains narrow 
																																																																																																																												
141. WEEE Member State Contacts, EUROPEAN COMMISSION,
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/waste/weee/contacts_en.htm (last updated 
Oct. 2012). 
142. See Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the European 
Community art. 176, Dec. 24, 2002, 2002 O.J. (C 325) 33, available at
http://www.frontex.europa.eu/assets/Legal_basis/12002E_EN.pdf. 
143. See U.S. DEP’T OF COM.’S INT’L TRADE ADMIN, supra note 73. 
 144. Esty, supra note 30, at 1560. 
 145. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 8, at 2. 
146. See Regulations/Standards, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY,
http://www.epa.gov/waste/conserve/materials/ecycling/rules.htm (last updated 
Nov. 7, 2013); Existing environmental regulations are intended to limit the 
pollution created by manufacturing and neglect externalities incurred past 
the products’ end-of-life cycle. See Sachs, supra note 72, at 57-58 (stating that 
U.S. regulations are focused on the release of Volatile Organic Compounds 
(“VOCs”) during manufacturing, but not of finished products that release 
VOCs during use or upon disposal). 
147. See generally Brief Comparison of State Laws on Electronics Recycling, 
ELECTRONICS TAKE BACK COALITION, http://www.electronicstakeback.com/wp-
content/uploads/Compare_state_laws_chart.pdf (last updated Sept. 19, 2013). 
 148. Drayton, supra note 95, at 166. 
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control over CRTs.149 The EPA’s CRT rule, introduced in 2006, 
requires exporters to notify the EPA of their expected exports 
of CRTs and to acquire consent of importing countries if CRTs 
are to be recycled overseas.150 Nevertheless, exporters can easi-
ly get around the law by intentionally mislabeling shipments of 
CRTs to avoid regulation.151 
Moreover, existing environmental legislation also embodies 
jurisdictional mismatch by creating conflicts with WTO legisla-
tion because both attempt to regulate e-waste. 152 For instance, 
there are conflicts between the WTO and the Basel Convention 
where two countries are both members of the WTO, but only 
one is a Basel Convention Party.153 Such conflicts may revolve 
around whether waste regulated by the Basel Convention is a 
“product” as defined by the WTO, if complying with the Basel 
Convention would violate the WTO’s Most Favored Nation 
Treatment, or if a trade restriction under the Basel Convention 
could be justified as an exception to the WTO’s laws.154 A key 
source of contention is Article I of the General Agreement on 
Trade and Tariffs (“GATT”); it states that all rules, advantages, 
or privileges granted by any WTO member for the import and 
export of any product originating in or destined for any other 
																																																																																																																												
 149. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 8, at 6-7. 
 150. 40 C.F.R § 261.39(a)(5) (2007) (Conditional Exclusion for Used, Broken 
Cathode Ray Tubes (“CRTs”) and Processed CRT Glass Undergoing Recy-
cling). See also Regulation of Cathode Ray Tubes, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION 
AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/osw/hazard/recycling/electron/index.htm (last 
updated May 17, 2013); Export Requirements for Cathode Ray Tubes, U.S. 
ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, 
http://www.epa.gov/osw/hazard/international/crts/index.htm (last updated 
Dec. 21, 2012). 
 151. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 8, at 6-7, 23-31. 
The GAO found in its August 2008 evaluation that violations of the CRT rule 
continued to be “widespread” after the EPA adopted the CRT rule. Forty-
three U.S.-based electronic recyclers did not comply with the CRT rule when 
transacting with undercover GAO representatives acting as fictitious Asian 
buyers. 
 152. PAUL P. APPASAMY, INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS ON HAZARDOUS 
CHEMICALS 182 (2006), available at 
http://www.mse.ac.in/Trade/pdf/Compendium%20Part%20B/5.%20PPA-chem-
conven(2.4.07).pdf. 
 153. WTO regulation applies to “products” and could likely apply to wastes 
covered by the Basel Convention because they are “‘moveable items placed in 
international commerce,” e.g., for recycling. Id. 
 154. Id. at 183-84. 
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country must be given “immediately and unconditionally” to a 
like product originating in or destined for the territory of all 
other WTO members.155 This represents potential trade conflict 
and can give rise to challenges at the WTO if a country that is 
both a party to the Basel Convention and a member of the 
WTO bans the import and export of hazardous e-waste to and 
from a country that is a WTO member but is not a party to the 
Basel Convention.156 Under the Most Favored Nation Clause in 
Article I of the GATT, a country that is not a party to the Basel 
Convention could bring a dispute in WTO courts that the Basel 
Convention unfairly favors another country that is trading e-
waste, based on the claim that the nonparty country trades 
products that are “like product” vis-à-vis e-waste.157 Given such 
conflicts, harmful e-waste continues to escape control of both 
the Basel Convention and the GATT regulatory systems and 
continues to harm the developing countries to which it is ex-
ported. 
III. RECONCILING THE REGULATORY COMMONS OF E-WASTE 
REGULATION 
Global e-waste regulations manifest the challenges present in 
the regulatory commons, i.e., jurisdictional mismatch, regula-
tory fragmentation, overlap, and regulators’ reduced perception 
of social need. These regulations would benefit from imple-
menting effective solutions to reconcile the regulatory commons 
paradox and more effectively manage e-waste. Analyzing e-
waste regulation through the lens of the regulatory commons, 
one can see that government actors are both the cause and the 
solution to the problem.158 On the one hand, government actors 
cannot claim ownership credit over regulations in the way that 
a private actor could patent a particular regulation as innova-
																																																																																																																												
 155. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, Apr. 15, 1994, Marra-
kesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, THE 
LEGAL TEXTS: THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE 
NEGOTIATIONS 17 (1999), 1867 U.N.T.S. 187, 33 I.L.M. 1153 (1994). 
 156. Id. 
 157. APPASAMY, supra note 152, at 184. 
 158. Information, its availability, and various beliefs affect how people at-
tribute and perceive causes of underlying problems. MILES HEWSTONE, FRANK 
D. FINCHAM, AND JONATHAN FOSTER, PSYCHOLOGY 368-74 (2005).  See also 
ESKRIDGE, supra note 114 
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tive and gain an early-mover advantage in the market.159 On 
the other hand, government actors can help resolve the para-
dox of the regulatory commons by unleashing market-based 
forces. 160 
First, a possible solution to the problem of the regulatory 
commons requires a particular government actor to rise as a 
prominent regulatory leader.161 By decreasing the number of 
potential regulators or increasing the significance of an exist-
ing regulator, the system creates a hierarchy of regulatory bod-
ies.162 Such a hierarchy would better allocate responsibility so 
that regulatory bodies can share responsibility, incentivize 
regulatory action, and avoid regulatory fragmentation and 
overlap.163 
Second, implementing an Open Method of Coordination 
(“OMC”) system could help overcome the challenge of regulato-
ry fragmentation that is present in the regulatory commons.164 
The OMC is a legal framework created at the Lisbon European 
Council in 2000 to improve competitiveness for employment 
opportunities and social cohesion among the EU member 
states.165 The OMC provides for a feedback and adjustment 
process that emphasizes “mutual correction, not uniformity.”166 
Experts across a broad spectrum of fields, drawn from member 
states, come together in a panel to evaluate and disseminate 
																																																																																																																												
 159. See generally MORRIS FIORINA, CONGRESS: KEYSTONE OF THE 
WASHINGTON ESTABLISHMENT (2d ed. 1989) (noting that regulators’ ability to 
claim credit is diluted). James Madison also made a similar finding that rep-
utation and credit are “diminished in proportion to the number which is to 
share in the praise or blame.” Randall Strahan, Personal Motives, Constitu-
tional Forms, and the Public Good: Madison on Political Leadership, in JAMES 
MADISON: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF GOVERNMENT 69 (Samuel Kernell ed., 
2003). 
 160. Buzbee, supra note 25, at 6. 
 161. Id. at 49-51. 
 162. See Daniel A. Farber, Taking Slippage Seriously: Noncompliance and 
Creative Compliance in Environmental Law, 23 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 297 
(1999). 
 163. Id. (arguing that creating hierarchies helps overcome regulatory inac-
tion and regulatory fragmentation). 
 164. Buzbee, supra note 25, at 61. 
 165. Maria Joao Rodrigues, The Open Method of Coordination: A New Gov-
ernance Tool, 2-3 EUROPA/EUROPE 96 (2001). 
 166. Joshua Cohen & Charles F. Sabel, Sovereignty and Solidarity: EU and 
US, in PUBLIC GOVERNANCE IN THE AGE OF GLOBALIZATION, 694 (Karl-Heinz 
Ladeur ed., 2004). 
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information about each member state’s regulatory strategies.167 
As such, the initiative encourages planning, comparison, and 
coordination of policies168 and helps to improve social cohesion 
across the European nation-states.169 The OMC has been ex-
panded to other areas of regulation170 and may be a good solu-
tion to resolving problems in e-waste regulation. 
Third, the problems of the regulatory commons can also be 
resolved by a shift in power from government actors to private 
business actors that lead entrepreneurial, decentralized units 
and can act with a concentrated interest in regulating e-
waste.171 The promotion of a decentralization approach toward 
experimentation and information dissemination is commonly 
known as “democratic experimentalism.”172 Here, decentralized 
actors can be just as prominent as central government actors 
and can reinforce information sharing. 173  Unlike regulatory 
bodies, which have a poor sense of the pressing depletion of the 
regulatory opportunity, decentralized business actors are more 
flexible in their behaviors.174 Furthermore, private sector busi-
nesses are empowered with managerial autonomy and liaison 
arrangements, placing them in a better position to counteract 
overregulation. By their very nature, private sector businesses 
are focused on sharing profits and are not subject to the same 
sense of transparency and accountability to an electorate or 
constituency, as regulators often are.175 Thus, democratic ex-
perimentalism fosters information sharing and reinforces de-
																																																																																																																												
 167. Id. 
 168. Jos Berghman & Kieke G.H. Okma, The Method of Open Co-
ordination: Open Procedures or Closed Circuit? Social Policy Making Between 
Science and Politics, 4 EUR. J. SOC. SEC. 331 (2002) (highlighting the ad-
vantages of the open method of coordination). 
 169. Cohen & Sabel, supra note 166, at 694-95. 
 170. Fritz W. Scharpf, The European Social Model: Coping With the Chal-
lenges of Diversity, 4 J. COMMON MKT. STUD. 645, 652-56 (2002). 
 171. Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic Ex-
perimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267 (1998) (noting how design of legal in-
stitutions can be modeled after that of business institutions to benefit from 
decentralized units). See, e.g., HANS WISSEMA, UNIT MANAGEMENT: 
ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND COORDINATION IN THE DECENTRALISED FIRM 11-12 
(1992) (stating that fast changing markets need “an increase in ‘entrepre-
neurial density’” within firms). 
 172. See Dorf & Sabel, supra note 171. 
 173. Id. at 354-56. 
 174. See generally id. at 368-69. 
 175. MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION (1965). 
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centralized autonomy in order to overcome the challenges 
posed by the regulatory commons.176 
Collectively, these solutions will help achieve the goals in-
tended by the current overabundance of e-waste regulations.177 
By providing for a clear delineation of authoritative hierarchy 
and responsibilities, the creation of an OMC system, and the 
promotion of democratic experimentalism, regulators can over-
come regulatory fragmentation, reconcile conflicts from over-
lapping regulations and jurisdictional mismatch, and prevent 
political inattention. In this way, regulators, who created the 
problem of the regulatory commons in the first place, can foster 
regulatory frameworks that overcome collective action prob-
lems in the regulatory commons.178 
CONCLUSION 
To effectively overcome the challenges of the regulatory 
commons, international regulation of e-waste should shift the 
burden from weak international entities to more authoritative 
individuals and better engage actors to increase awareness via 
democratic experimentalism. Japan’s SHAR system provides a 
model that stands out for its simplicity and effectiveness. Im-
plemented in 2001, the SHAR system distributes e-waste recy-
cling responsibilities among four stakeholders: producers, con-
sumers, retailers, and the government.179 SHAR mandates that 
consumers must dispose of bulky electrical and electronic 
products such as televisions, refrigerators, washing machines, 
and air conditioners at designated collection locations main-
tained by large appliance retailers and local government agen-
cies.180 Manufacturers are divided into two groups.181 Within 
each group, manufacturers collaborate to establish and operate 
                                                                                                                            
 176. See Dorf & Sabel, supra note 171, cited in Buzbee, supra note 25, at 59. 
 177. Id. at 24. 
 178. Id. 
 179. Lin et al., supra note 26, 541-42 (2002). 
 180. Id. 
 181. Group A includes Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., Ltd., Toshiba 
Corp., to name a few prominent manufacturers. Group B includes Hitachi, 
Ltd., Sanyo Electric Co, Ltd, Sharp Corp, Sony Corp, Fujitsu General Ltd., 
Mitsubishi Electric Corp. Kiyoshi Ueno, Current Status of Home Appliance 
Recycling in Japan, EPC NEWSLETTER, No. 18, available at 
http://www.rezagos.com/descargas/Current%20Status%20of%20Home%20Ap
pliance%20Recycling%20in%20Japan.pdf. 
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recycling plants and a network of collection centers.182 Then, 
other manufacturers and importers can contract with either 
group to participate in the manufacturers’ takeback and recy-
cling networks. 183  Under SHAR, manufacturers manage the 
end-of-life processing of electronics after collection and develop 
facilities and logistics chains necessary to transport and recycle 
discarded electronics in an environmentally friendly way.184
Meanwhile, consumers help finance SHAR’s collection and re-
cycling mechanisms by paying disposal fees when dropping off 
used electronic goods at the collection centers. 185  While the 
WEEE Directive places complete end-of-life management re-
sponsibilities on manufacturers, Japan’s SHAR system is more 
effective because it employs democratic experimentalism to 
solve the problems of the regulatory commons. 
Unlike most other developed nations, Japan’s SHAR system 
effectively promotes public education regarding the e-waste is-
sue and recruits consumers as responsible actors in delivering 
e-waste and paying for its disposal.186 Because disposal fees dif-
fer based on the cost of recycling individual brands and waste 
items, SHAR encourages consumers to change purchasing hab-
its, buy less, and, when they do buy, to buy environmentally 
friendly products.187 SHAR uses existing networks of retailers 
and local governments to operate collection centers and more 
																																																																																																																												
 182. Lin et al., supra note 26, at 542. 
183. Id. 
 184. SHAR holds the largest electronics manufacturers responsible for 
building the infrastructure and facilities necessary to process e-waste, while 
smaller manufacturers must negotiate agreements to access these networks. 
See INFORM, INC., Electric Appliance Recycling in Japan, 1 (2003), available at 
http://informinc.org/japanepr.pdf. Inform, Inc. is a U.S.-based nonprofit that 
produces short films to educate the public about the effects of human activity 
on the environment and human health. This publication explains how Japan 
enacted responsibility mandates for the disposal of electronic appliances. 
 185. Manufacturers set recycling fees for their own products and such fees 
usually range from 2,400 to 4,600 yen, or US$23.50 to US$45. Pak, supra 
note 74, at 275-78. Under SHAR, consumers pay two types of fees upon dis-
posal of e-waste at collection centers: a collection fee to cover the cost of col-
lection and a recycling fee to cover the cost of recycling a particular item. Id. 
186. See id. Additionally, the EPA has found that most computer users are 
unaware of the problems e-waste presents. TACHI KIUCHI ET AL., GLOBAL 
FUTURES FOUNDATION, COMPUTERS, E-WASTE, AND PRODUCT STEWARDSHIP: IS
CALIFORNIA READY FOR THE CHALLENGE? (2001), available at
http://infohouse.p2ric.org/ref/41/40164.htm. 
 187. Pak, supra note 74, at 275-78. 
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proportionately allocates cost to consumers. 188  Furthermore, 
unlike the WEEE Directive, SHAR also serves as a paradigm 
for individual, producer-led takeback programs by requiring 
manufacturers to manage the disposal and recycling of their 
waste and enabling them to determine disposal costs for these 
products.189 
It could be argued that by mandating that consumers both 
physically dispose of used electronics at specified collection cen-
ters and pay end-of-life fees, Japan’s e-waste policies may in-
centivize some individuals to illegally dump unwanted elec-
tronics rather than obey the regulations.190 For example, one 
month after SHAR became effective, the rate of illegal e-waste 
dumping in Japan increased by 25%.191 Coordinating such col-
lection systems and determining individual producers’ costs 
can also be expensive.192 Nevertheless, Japan’s overall success 
demonstrates that the assignment of individual costs in e-
waste regulation can be done effectively. Even if the collective 
system proves too arduous for certain manufacturers, these 
manufacturers still have the option to implement their own in-
dividual takeback programs, for instance, as Panasonic has 
done in its home country, Japan, and in many countries outside 
Japan.193 Consumers can also fund transactional expenses as-
																																																																																																																												
 188. INFORM, INC., supra note 184 (explaining how Japan’s postal service 
provides ubiquitous and easily accessible collection infrastructure). Addition-
ally, manufacturers are also incentivized to create more environmentally 
sound electronics with longer product lives. See Pak, supra note 74, at 272-73. 
 189. Pak, supra note 74, at 272-73. 
 190. Lin et al., supra note 26, at 542. 
 191. Id. 
 192. Hannah G. Elisha, Addressing the E-Waste Crisis: The Need for Com-
prehensive Federal E-Waste Regulation Within the U.S., 14 CHAP. L. REV. 195, 
231 (2010) (stating the opinion of  SHAR’s critics). 
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sociated with determining and assigning individual product 
costs by adapting their purchasing behavior. Thus, interna-
tional environmental regulation can be decentralized in order 
to provide economic incentives for e-waste producers, recyclers, 
and consumers alike, while enabling states to better promote 
human health and environmental safety. 
As a next step, rather than signing onto another multilateral 
treaty, government authorities and private actors should aim 
to implement a decentralized model analogous to that of Ja-
pan’s SHAR system. Using reduction of e-waste and illegal ex-
ports as a measure of experimental success, public and private 
parties will benefit if they can replicate and adopt such a model 
on a global scale. 
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